Xuet al. [4] proposed a scheme which supports anonymity of the voters
in the e-voting system by applying the concept of blinding and grouping
signature. This scheme seems to be easier than the other quantum
signature schemes because i t d o e s not involve entanglement. In t h e
e-voting system, the message has to be signed by the manager of the
office. However, the content of the message d o e s not h a v e to be
readable by any person other than the owner of the message (blind
signature scheme). Also, Xu’s paper uses the grouping signature to
provide anonymity of voters in the e-voting system, whereas the voter
information, such as location information, has to be secure and
non-readable by any person. Some e-voting systems could be applied in
different branches and offices in different locations, so signing the
message from a specific manager might reveal the location information of
the voter. Thus, by applying grouping signature with different managers
on the same message, f tracing the sender could be eliminated. However,
the verifier cannot know the identity of the signer; he/she can only
verify the validity of the signature. This paper is different than some
other schemes that propose different services. Xuet al. [4] proposes a
blind signature scheme using a group signature scheme for a distributed
e-voting system without using the entangled state concept, and this
scheme can represent a high level of efficiency. The authors explained
some disadvantages, such as using a symmetric scheme. Also, the
inspector in this scheme is the only person who can verify the message
which makes the scheme elastic with only e-voting systems. In [10], the
authors proposed a new quantum protocol that provides anonymous voting
with anonymity check. This protocol has two main characteristics. First,
the value of a voter’s vote is unknown to other voters and the
tallyman. Second, a non-exaggeration t e c h n i q u e h a s b e e n i m
p l e m e n t e d to prevent malicious voters from voting twice. Each
voter makes a binary decision (0,1); 0 means no and 1 means yes. There
is a tallyman who collects the ballots and announces the results. The
main idea, after the voting process, is that the ballots arereturned to
voters again to allow for two voters to check the anonymity of the vote
counting process bypreparing an entangled state of two ballots. Thus,
any attempt by a curious tallyman to g a i n information about voting
results leads to th e d e st r uc tio n of the entanglement, which can
be detected by the voters. The entangled state is generated using one of
four Bell bases to create a Bell state as follows: The four Bell bases
are:√√√√The voters carry out the ballot test: – The voters who have
chosen to vote measure their qubits in computational basis. If there is a
difference from the sent ballot, they state the ballot test failure. –
On the other hand, the voters who have chosen to check the anonymity
make the measurement of their qubits in the Bell basis. If there is a
difference from the Bell state, they state the ballot test failure.
Suppose a curious tallyman makes an additional measurement of qubits to
gain information about voters. For example, to learn the vote of voter
i, the easiest way is by measuring the ith qubit in computational basis.
If voter i has chosen to vote, this attack will be unnoticed. But if
voter i has chosen to check the anonymity with voter j, this leads their
state to be transformed into (0,1) or (1,0) with equal probability of
0.5, which means anonymity check test failure. Therefore, the curious
tallyman will be detected. Xiaoqiang proposed in [11] a blind signature
scheme that is based on quantum computing. The scheme combines proxy and
blind signatures. The scheme consists of four parties. They are Bob,
who is the message signer; Charlie, who is the message owner; Alice, who
prepares the proxy warrant message; and Trent, who is responsible for
delivering the two particles to Bob and Charlie and verifying the
signature.
The authors used BB84 quantum protocol for key distribution. They
applied quantum entanglement for the signature generation and
verification process. Using a one-time pad encryption algorithm provides
unconditional security and prevents eavesdropping. In [12], the authors
propose a blind quantum scheme based on a two-particle entangled
system. It combines proxy and blind signatures and consists of three
parties. Alice is the message owner, Bob is the message signer, and
Charlie is the message arbitrator and Bob’s proxy. This scheme can be
used in privacy-related protocols. The authors used entanglement to the
blind signature generation process and the verification process. The key
distribution method is not explained in this paper.
We proposed a new scheme that enhanced an existing one that solves
the check back e-voting anonymity to solve the problem of denying the
value of the ballot. By implementing the concept of the entanglement
between two random voters, the signer candetermine the correct value of
the ballot. However, this scheme has a simple weakness which shows up
when the signer (Bob) tries to contact the second voter (Nancy) asking
her for the qubit, but she does not respond. We are planning to extend
this scheme to address this problem by keeping the original qubits in a
separate database somewhere in the system. Code Shoppy
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